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ABSTRACT
The permanent removal of data from media is a major area of concern mainly because of the
misconception that once a file is deleted or storage media is formatted, it cannot be recovered.
There has been the development of both commercial and freeware data erasing tools, which
all claim complete file or disk erasure. This report analyzes the efficiency of a number of
these tools in performing erasures on an electromechanical drive. It focuses on a selection of
popular and modern erasing tools, taking into consideration their usability, claimed erasing
standards, and whether they perform complete data erasure with the use of the Write Zero
method.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Data in the 21st century has become an
epitome of controversy due to the count-
less occurrences of crimes associated with
data breaches and data loss. Most physi-
cal drives that are used to store either cor-
porate or personal data usually end up be-
ing sold when they are no longer required,
stolen, or lost. Examples include a report by
Historycoalition.org (2009), that the US
National Archives and Records Administra-
tion (NARA) reported the loss of an external
hard drive from the NARA College Park fa-
cility in Maryland. This hard drive contained
copies of sensitive personal information such
as names and social security numbers of indi-
viduals who may have worked or visited the
White House during Clinton’s Presidency.
In another fairly recent incident, the Mir-
ror (2017) also reported a massive data loss
threat that involved a USB stick, which was
found in the streets of London, containing
highly confidential information belonging to
Heathrow Airport. The drive consisted of 76
unencrypted folders, which included precise
routes Her Majesty the Queen uses in the air-
port, maps showing the tunnel networks and
escape shafts linked to the Heathrow Express,
and many more. These pieces of information,
in the wrong hands, can be used in malicious
attacks.
A significant question that is related to
data removal is, “Can data be completely
erased if no longer required?” The perception
that non-technical individuals tend to have is
that once a file is deleted from the recycle bin
or a drive is formatted, and the data cannot
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be recovered. However, when the Recycle
bin or Trash folder is emptied, the operating
system only removes pointers to the deleted
data. The information remains on the hard
disk until another file overwrites it. With the
formatting of drives, if the ‘quick’ format is
used, data is not removed as formatting only
reinitializes the file system of the drive, as
explained by Rothke (2009). Even with new
overwrites, some of the data might still be
recovered. This misconception has led to nu-
merous data breaches and loss of confidential
information to identity thieves and hackers.
The aim of this research was to examine
some of the most popular and easily acces-
sible data erasing tools and evaluate their
efficiency based on their performance and
ability to completely erase drives with the
Write Zero wiping method. The reasons for
carrying out this study were that it had been
some time since a comparative study was car-
ried out, and in the intervening period, new
tools have become available and existing tools
have been updated. In view of this, standard
experiments were conducted on an electrome-
chanical hard disk using 8 data erasing tools,
namely, Hard Wipe, Eraser, Macrorit Data
Wiper, Active KillDisk, Disk Wipe, Puran
Wipe Disk, Remo Drive Wipe, and Super
File Shredder. Solid state drives were not
included in this research because, with the
wear leveling algorithms that are in use and
the current state of the art, there is no scien-
tifically proven method that can be used to
ascertain that all sectors of the storage me-
dia have been accessed and overwritten. This
issue will be examined in future research.
1.1 Motivation
With the surge in data related crimes, orga-
nizations and individuals are investing heav-
ily in keeping data safe and secure from un-
wanted parties. Studies show that almost 5
million data items are reported missing or
stolen worldwide every day, which implies 58
items are lost every second (Drolet, 2019).
Corporate organizations are spending mil-
lions of pounds to avoid data breaches and
losses. The general public also had their fair
share of data loss due to the general lack of
knowledge in relation to media sanitization.
It is therefore essential to address the prob-
lem of data erasure and help identify the best
and most easily accessible tools for media
sanitization associated with storage devices
notably hard drives, as they are considered as
one of the most commonly used primary stor-
age devices to store confidential and sensitive
information (Valli and Jones, 2005).
1.2 Project Phases
The project started in February 2019 and
was carried out in 5 phases:
• Literature review. This phase includes
an investigation of past and recent pa-
pers that relate to erasing of data on
storage media devices, the known data
erasing standards, and other notable top-
ics associated with data erasing;
• Research of Erasing Tools. This phase
involves the study and investigation into
free versions of data erasing tools that
have the Write Zero method as one of the
supported erasing standards. As a result,
8 tools were acquired and installed;
• Creation of dataset for evaluation. This
phase consisted of the acquisition of
different file types that were used as
datasets for the research;
• Experimentation and Analysis. This
phase involved the testing of all the
selected erasing tools and also exam-
ines their wiped disk images to enable
the analysis of the results and included,
where relevant, an attempt to recover
deleted data;
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• Conclusion and Recommendations. In
this phase, the results of the analysis and
evaluation of the selected erasing tools
are documented. Recommendations of
the top performing tools are also made
during this phase of the project.
2. RELATED WORK
The digital forensics area has witnessed a
plethora of contributions confirming and dis-
proving major data concepts, and data era-
sure is not an exception. Data storage has
immensely improved from the days of mag-
netic tapes and floppy disks to the more cur-
rent forms of storage devices such as flash
drives, electromechanical hard drives, Solid-
State Drives (SSDs), and cloud storage. Most
forms of storage, at the end of their lifecycles,
are sold, donated, or destroyed.
Sahri et al. (2018) argued how fragile soft-
ware and hardware involved in data storage
could be and estimated the lifespan to be
about five years. Other reports on the life
expectancy of data storage devices were pro-
vided by (Brook, 2017), which highlighted
that the lifespan of such devices depends on
a number of factors, including usage rates,
environmental factors, and manufacturing.
In addition, (Brook, 2017) provided an esti-
mated life expectancy for hard disks to be
3 to 5 years and flash storage devices to be
5 to 10 years, depending on the number of
write cycles, meaning the more you delete
and write new data on the devices, the faster
the devices deteriorate.
The sanitization of media is of great im-
portance to both corporate organizations and
individuals. The NIST SP 800-88 Guidelines
to Media Sanitization by the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology (2006)
addresses the need for adequate media saniti-
zation and the impact it has, if not properly
conducted. The document categorizes media
into two types; Hard Copy, which includes
paper printouts, and Electronic or Soft Copy,
which include hard drives, Random Access
Memory (RAM), Compact and Floppy Disks
etc. The document further explained the dif-
ferent types of sanitization. It grouped sani-
tization into four types, namely, Discarding,
Clearing, Purging, and Destroying. Discard-
ing involves getting rid of media without any
sanitization method.
Discarding has consequences as reported
in a news article by BBC (2019), where the
medical records of patients, which had sen-
sitive information such as bank and contact
details were found in an abandoned nursing
home in Hampshire. The second type of
sanitization, Clearing, entails high levels of
data destruction, which include overwriting
using hardware or software tools. Purging
is similar to Clearing and includes methods
such as Secure Erase and Degaussing. Lastly,
destroying as the name implies involves physi-
cally destroying media by shredding, melting,
disintegration etc.
Countless data wiping techniques, in the
form of software or hardware, have been
adopted to aid in data erasure from storage
media devices. Companies and individuals
tend to purchase or freely download eras-
ing tools to remove data on storage devices.
Sansurooah et al. (2013) revealed that the
licensing of such data erasing tools, whether
freely available or commercial based, does not
reflect on their data wiping efficiency and fur-
ther recommended some free and commercial
tools for secure data removal.
Martin and Jones (2011) argued in their
paper, how inefficient some eraser tools can
be and further pointed out how some files af-
ter supposed total wiping were still accessible
using recovery tools.
Similar to the recommendations of the
NIST Guidelines to Media Sanitization
(2006), experts advise that one of the best
and safest ways to destroy data from stor-
age devices is to destroy these devices phys-
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ically. According to (Veritysystems.com,
2017), smashing storage devices such as hard
drives with a hammer is a faster and more
direct method of getting rid of data. How-
ever, this method is considered wasteful and
costly, especially for private individuals, and
is not environmentally ‘friendly.’
There are numerous software-based data
erasing standards currently being used.
These include the Peter Gutmann’s Algo-
rithm, Bruce Schneier’s Algorithm, the US
Department of Defense (DoD) 5220.22-M
standard, Secure Erase, Random Data, Write
Zero, the Russian GOST R 50739-95, the Ger-
man VSITR method and the British HMG
IS5, both Baseline and Enhanced.
One of the earliest erasing standards was
the Peter Gutmann Algorithm, proposed by
Peter Gutmann in 1996. Gutmann (1996)
proposed an algorithm for erasing magnetic
media, which implements 35 overwrite passes,
with the first and last four passes being ran-
dom data overwrites. However, Gutmann’s
algorithm is considered by most experts to
be overkill and not relevant to modern drives.
With the increasing size of storage media,
it is also impractical as the time taken to
erase a drive would be considerable. Wright
et al. (2008) indicated that one overwrite is
required for data wiping and that the mis-
conception that recovery tools can retrieve
gigabytes of data from erased media drives
is unfounded.
Several methods that were previously ex-
amined in Wright et al., (2008) for the re-
covery of data from electromagnetic disks,
including the Bitter technique, Lorentz mi-
croscopy, and Magnetic Force Microscopy,
were discounted as unachievable given the de-
velopments in data storage densities of mod-
ern disks. For completeness these are detailed
below:
• “The Bitter technique involves the coat-
ing of the platter with a thin film of ferro-
fluid. This fluid contains ferro-particles
that associate most strongly with the
field vectors on the drive providing a
magnetization pattern. This is known
as “Bitter patterns” and maps to the
magnetic field vectors. Depending on
the track density, either a high powered
optical microscope or a scanning elec-
tron microscope (SEM) can be used to
observe the platters. This technique has
become far less effective in recent times
due to the increasing drive density. The
technique is invasive and will result in
the destruction of the drive platter.
• Lorentz microscopy uses an electron
beam that is fired at the drive platter.
Magnetic fields produce an effect known
as the Lorentz force. This force deflects
the electron beam. These deflections can
be measured using a Scanning Electron
Microscope (SEM). The SEM will then
return the deflection pattern, which can
be used to “map” the encoded drive im-
age. More recently, Transmission Elec-
tron Microscopes (TEM) have been used
for this process. This is a slow process
that is economically infeasible for use on
most modern hard drives.
• Magnetic Force Microscopy is a variety
of imaging techniques known as Scan-
ning Probe Microscopy (SPM). This
technique uses an enormously fine (and
expensive to replace) point that is
mounted on a flexible cantilever. This
tip “raster-scans” the drive platter fol-
lowing the magnetic force vectors. As
the reader is coated with a ferromagnetic
material, the field interactions attract or
repel the tip. These movements are mea-
sured through the cantilever, allowing
an accurate map of the magnetization-
induced field to be produced. Magnetic
Force scanning Tunnelling Microscopy
Page 4 c© 2020 JDFSL
Data Erasing Tools JDFSL V15N1
(MFSTM) is one form of MFM. This
method uses the tunneling currents that
are created through the movement of
the probe to produce a two-dimensional
spatial map of the magnetic field coordi-
nates. This map is used to decode the
“bits” on the drive.”
Another popular erasing standard, the
DOD 5220.22-M, was developed by the US
National Industrial Security Program (NISP).
It involves the 3 passes, namely: writing 0’s
and verify for Pass 1, writing 1’s and verify
for Pass 2, and for Pass 3; writing random
characters and verify. There are other forms
of DOD 5220.22-M, such as DoD 5220.22-
M ECE, which has seven passes. Also, the
Random Data method, as the name implies,
overwrites the drive sectors with pseudoran-
dom data in order to disrupt data recovery.
Another widely-known erasing standard is
the Write Zero standard, which is sometimes
known as Single Overwrite or Zero-fill. It
is an erasing standard that overwrites all
sectors on the media with zeros in order to
prevent data recovery (Disk-partition.com,
2019). The Write Zero standard is one of
the fastest erasing standards, as discussed by
Sansurooah et al. (2013) in their paper “An
Investigation Into The Efficiency Of Foren-
sic Data Erasure Tools For Removable USB
Flash Memory Storage Devices.” This is the
standard that has been adopted for this re-
search for the primary reason that it is pos-
sible to examine a disk that has been ‘ze-
roed’ and have a level of confidence in the
results, whereas a disk that has been over-
written with pseudorandom characters would
be much more difficult and time consuming
to analyze. A disk that has been ‘zeroed’ can
also easily have the hash compared to the
original cleaned disk.
3. EREASING TOOLS
There are a large number of data erasing tools
available on the internet, either for free down-
load or under a commercial license. These
tools use the earlier stated erasing standards
to wipe and dispose of data. It should be
noted that the tools to be used in this re-
search have been selected mainly because of
their easy accessibility, free license, and their
ability to use the write zero method. The
tools selected for the research are:
• Active @ KillDisk (https://killdisk.
com/eraser.html): This is produced
by LSoft Technologies Inc. This prod-
uct has both free and commercial ver-
sions. Some of the limitations of the
freeware version are that: it only sup-
ports only one pass zeros, no verification
after erasing, no customization for cer-
tificates, and erase methods, and it is
limited to two parallel disk erases.
• Eraser (https://eraser.heidi.ie/):
This is produced by Heidi Computers
and is free to use. The software erases
previously deleted data and supports any
drive that works with Windows. The lat-
est version of Eraser is 6.2.0. 2982
and it allows users to specify file targets
to be erased. The free version only pro-
vides the one pass zeros option, while
the paid version offers the options of the
DoD 5220.22.M 3 pass and 7 pass and
Peter Gutmann’s Algorithms.
• Disk Wipe (http://www.diskwipe.
org/): This is a free and portable eras-
ing software for Windows. It supports
DoD 5220.22-M, Peter Gutmann’s
Algorithm, and other advanced erasing
standards. It can be used to erase USB
sticks, SD cards, and other portable
memory devices.
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• Macrorit Data Wiper (https:
//macrorit.com/): This is owned
by Macrorit Inc and has both free and
commercial software versions. Macrorit
Data Wipe supports Windows and
can also be used as bootable media
(Commercial version only). The free
version supports SSDs and does not
include adware, spyware, and malware.
• Super File Shredder (http:
//www.kakasoft.com/): This is
owned by Kakasoft Software Company
Limited and is a free data destruction
tool. It is compatible with Windows and
supports Write Zero, DoD 5220.22-M,
the Secure Erase algorithm with 7
passes, and Gutmann’s Algorithm.
• Hard Wipe (https://www.hardwipe.
com/): This is licensed by Big Angry
Dog Ltd, is an erasing tool with both free
and commercial versions. It supports
Windows and bootable media (commer-
cial version only). The free edition of
Hard Wipe does not support verification
of each pass. The latest version is 5.2.1
and is a 64-bit only software.
• Puran Wipe Disk (http://www.
puransoftware.com/): This is owned
by Puran Software and is a free software
utility. The latest version of this tool
is 1.2. Puran Software also provides
other utility suites under its commercial
license, such as a Registry Cleaner,
a disk cleaner, a file recovery kit etc.
Puran Wipe Disk is compatible with
Windows and supports 1 pass, 3 passes,
and 7 passes.
• Remo Drive Wipe (https:
//www.remosoftware.com/): This
is licensed by Remo Software and has its
latest software version as 2.0.0.25. It
has both free and commercial versions.
It is a Windows compatible tool and
supports both 32-bit and 64-bit. The
free version supports Write Zero,
Random Data Overwrite, and the US
DOD 5220.22-M.
It should be noted that two other erasing
tools, namely, DBAN and CBL Data Shred-
der, were reviewed but not included in the
experiments. Even though these tools are
popular and easily accessible, there is a lack
of technical support available, which implies
that they are no longer supported. No recent
updates were found for these tools.
Appendix A provides a visual summary of
the selected erasing tools, giving details such
as the name of the tool, the version number,
their licenses, the Operating System (OS)
needed to run the tool, the size of the down-
loaded setup file, and other relevant features
of the tools:
3.1 Evaluation Tools
There are a number of tools that were used
in the evaluation and analysis of the selected
Data Erasers. These are detailed below:
• USB Write Blocker : This was used to
prevent the operating system from writ-
ing to an attached device. This was used
in the creation and analysis of the image
of the wiped disk for analysis.
• WinHex Editor : This was used to ex-
amine, view, and analyze the physical
contents of disk images.
• Autopsy : This is a forensic tool that
is used in examining and viewing hex,
strings, and metadata of files. It is the
graphical interface to The Sleuth Kit
and also used in providing search and
data carving functions.
• OSForensics : This is a forensic software
suite that performs similar functional-
ities as Autopsy. It was used in the
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creation of images of wiped disks during
the experiments.
• Command Prompt “tasklist /v”: this
Windows CMD command was used to
extract the CPU times and Memory Us-
age of the various data erasing tools.
3.2 Experimental Process
The experiments were conducted on a Win-
dows 10 workstation with 64-bit Operating
System, 2.5 GHz i7 CPU, and an 8 GB RAM.
The Hard Disk used in the data wiping ex-
periments was an 80 GB 3.5” electromechan-
ical SATA drive. In addition, a Virtual Box,
version 6.0.4, was used to run virtual work-
stations. During each experiment, the Hard
Disk was initialized using the Master Boot
Record (MBR) partition style and New Tech-
nology File System (NTFS) file system. In
order to equally measure and evaluate each
erasing tool, a known set of file types was
copied onto the Hard disk for erasure. These
are detailed below:
The file types occupied approximately 9
GB of the disk. This was done to allow for
excess space on the disk, which would be
evaluated when viewing unallocated clusters
during the analysis of the various erasing
tools. In evaluating each erasing tool, for
consistency, individual experiments were con-
ducted by following the processes listed be-
low:
• Use a hardware tool to wipe a disk in
which every sector was wiped with 0’s
and from which an MD5 hash value was
created;
• Copy data set files onto the wiped disk
and compare the MD5 sums of the files
on the disk with their originals for veri-
fication;
• Run the erasing tool using the single-
pass Write Zero method;
• Run tasklist1 to capture the memory and
CPU usage of the erasing tool;
• Disconnect disk on completion of disk
erasure;
• Reconnect the Hard disk using the Write
blocker software;
• Create an image of the erased disk;
• Import image of the erased disk for anal-
ysis, looking for details such as all zeros
patterns, customized software signatures
and any other unusual data in the disk
sectors;
• Export and check the MD5 digests of the
whole image and also any recovered files
if found, comparing them to the original
files;
• Analyze recovered files with Autopsy to
carve fragments.
4. ANALYSIS OF
TOOLS
The erasing tools were downloaded from their
respective websites and installed. The anal-
ysis of each tool conformed to the following
template:
• Review of claims made by the erasing
tool;
• Assess how informative and user friendly
the tool is;
• Record the running time, CPU time and
Memory Usage of the tool;
1The TASKLIST command is used to display a list
of currently-running tasks and displays the process
ID number for each running task and the name of
the executable program that started the task.
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Figure 1. Summary of File Types used in the experiment
• Import wiped disk image to OSForensics,
Autopsy and Win Hex for hash file com-
parison and raw disk viewing at sector
level;
• Record outcome of disk analysis;
• Perform data recovery and carving from
the wiped disk image if any artifacts
found.
Below is the analysis of the data erasing tools:
4.1 Hard Wipe
Hard Wipe for desktop is a popular eras-
ing tool that has a portable version, which
enables users to boot from a USB drive. How-
ever, this functionality is limited to the profes-
sional version. The free version of Hard Wipe
boasts support for Zero Overwrites, Random
Data, GOST R 50739-95, DOD 5220.22-M,
Schneier’s Algorithm, German VSITR, and
Gutmann’s Algorithm. Hard Wipe claims
permanent erasure of data on disks and other
portable storage devices. It integrates with
the Windows file explorer, which allows users
to right-click in order to gain access to the
software. The tool also has the facility for the
cleaning of the recycle bin, page file, and free
space. It has an informative and straightfor-
ward user interface that is easy to navigate.
In addition to the benefits of Hardwipe, the
tool provides a log report that informs users
of vital information such as I/O Errors that
occurred during wiping, failed items, and
whether there was a verification pass. One
disadvantage is that it contains an advertise-
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ment panel, which is found in the window of
the tool. Also, Hard Wipe does not allow the
wiping of an active running Windows drive.
4.1.1 Analysis
During the analysis phase, the md5 checksum
of the image of the wiped disk corresponded
with that of the baseline hardware-wiped disk,
1b26c0e62b79f528793199a3d2de4034. This
initial outcome suggested complete disk era-
sure, but further analysis of the wiped disk
was conducted to confirm this hypothesis.
The run time, CPU time, and memory usage
used by the tool in wiping the disk are shown
below:
The wiped disk image, when viewed in
WinHex showed a total of 80,026,361,856
bytes with every byte being 0’s, including the
boot sector. This outcome implied that the
disk was wiped completely.
4.2 Eraser
Eraser is a free, simple, and easy to use
erasing tool that possesses many features.
It supports Windows XP (Service Pack 3),
Vista, Windows Server 2003 (Service Pack
2), Server 2008, Server 2012, Server 2016,
Windows 7, 8, and 10. Eraser is also re-
garded as a file eraser due to its ability to
erase user-specified files and folders. It allows
the erasure of the recycle bin, unused disk
space, partitions, SSDs, and electromechan-
ical drives. It possesses the ability for data
erasure to be scheduled for a specified time
and provides users the option to set recurring
data erasure either daily, weekly, or monthly.
Eraser boasts supporting a variety of eras-
ing standards namely: Pseudorandom data,
British HMG IS5 (Baseline), British HMG
IS5 (Enhanced), Russian GOST P50739-95,
US Army AR380-19, DOD 5220.22-M (E),
DOD 5220.22-M (ECE), US Air Force 5020,
Canadian RCMP TSSIT OPS-II, German
VSITR, and Schneier’s Algorithm. It should
be noted that the British HMG IS5 (Base-
line) is similar to the Write Zero method.
Also, Eraser permits a user to unlock locked
files for erasure and also replace erased files
with user-selected folders or files. The down-
side of the tool is its high memory usage and
CPU time as compared to the other erasing
tools. Another demerit is its inability to pro-
vide ample information during data wiping.
Lastly, it does not allow the wiping of an
active running Windows drive.
4.2.1 Analysis
Below are the details of the run time, CPU
time, and memory usage of the tool: Dur-
ing disk analysis, it was found that the
md5 checksum of the wiped disk image was
1e74a04dc99e2d938458047a942db2df, which
differed from that of the hardware-wiped disk,
1b26c0e62b79f528793199a3d2de4034, and as
a result, warranted further examination. The
Eraser-wiped disk image was analyzed, firstly
using WinHex to determine what accounted
for the md5 checksum discrepancy. It was
observed that the boot sector still contained
512 bytes of data. Also, during the analy-
sis of the disk image with OSForensics, it
was discovered that there were data in the
last sector of the disk. This observation de-
noted that Eraser did not wipe the FAT2
portion of the disk. The wiped disk image
was subjected to data recovery and carving
using both OSForensics and Autopsy, which
yielded no results. There was no evidence of
Images, Videos, Audio, databases, archives,
and other deleted files. Indexes could not be
created using OSForensics due to the absence
of recovered file types from the image.
4.3 Macrorit Data Wiper
Macrorit Data Wiper is a data wiping soft-
ware that has both free and commercial ver-
sions and supports Windows XP, Vista, Win-
dows Server 2003, 2008, 2012, Home Server
2011, Windows 7, 8, and 10. Macrorit Data
Wiper also supports bootable media, but this
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Figure 2. Run Time, CPU Time and Memory Usage of Hard Wipe
Figure 3. Run Time, CPU Time and Memory Usage of Eraser
is limited to the commercial version. The
tool allows users to wipe the recycle bin, par-
titions, external drives such as USB flash
drives and memory sticks, and entire hard
or Solid-State drives. Macrorit Data Wiper
does not wipe optical storage media such as
compact disks, optical disks (DVD) etc., and
prescribes that these media should be physi-
cally destroyed. Macrorit Data Wiper claims
permanent data erasure with no possibility
of recovery. It also boasts of high-speed drive
wipes and not using large amounts of system
resources. Macrorit Data Wiper supports
the following erasing standards: write zeros
(1 pass), pseudorandom data (1 pass), zero
and one writes (2 passes), DoD 5220.22-M
(3 passes), DoD 5220.28-STD (7 passes), and
the Gutmann’s Algorithm (35 passes). The
tool has a very simple and uncomplicated
User Interface. Another advantage of the
tool is that it provides users with a confir-
mation window before data wiping. This is
to prevent the erasure of wrong storage me-
dia devices. Despite its advantages, Macrorit
Data Wiper is unable to wipe the primary
drive that has an active-running Windows
OS installed.
4.3.1 Analysis
During the analysis phase, the erasing
tool showed a minimal number of CPU
cycles. Below are details of its sys-
tem usage when the tool was run: The
MD5 checksum of the wiped disk was
925860097154ed5eab45ec6724650a86, which
did not correspond with that of the Hard-
ware wiped disk. Further disk analyses were
conducted in an attempt to determine the rea-
sons for the discrepancy. Firstly, the wiped
disk was viewed in WinHex to view the in-
dividual sectors. WinHex showed that the
boot sector contained data in the first 512
bytes, and the rest of the sectors were ze-
roed out. This implied that Macrorit Data
Wiper ignored the first sector and started
data sanitization afterward.
The hypothesis of Macrorit Data Wiper
ignoring the first sector was confirmed again
when the wiped disk was viewed using OS-
Forensics’ Raw Disk Viewer. The rest of the
sectors were filled with 0’s.
Lastly, the wiped disk was imported into
Autopsy to confirm all files, including System
Volume was erased completely. The unallo-
cated blocks did not produce any contents
hence confirming the hard disk was wiped
clean with the exception of the first 512 bytes.
4.4 Active KillDisk
Active KillDisk is a feature-filled data san-
itization software that has a detailed and
attractive user interface. It is a portable eras-
ing tool that provides complete data wiping
on electromechanical disks, solid-state drives,
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Figure 4. Run Time, CPU Time and Memory Usage of Macrorit Data Wiper
USBs and Memory sticks etc. It has both
free and commercial versions with the free-
ware version supporting Windows, MacOS,
and bootable media. Active KillDisk boasts
of parallel erasing where multiple drives can
be wiped simultaneously and independently.
It also has its own “Disk Viewer”, for analysis
of specified devices, its own “File Browser”,
and the ability to wipe both unused drive
clusters and slack space in file clusters.
Active KillDisk provides users with the
option to customize the first sector with a
user-specified fingerprint or signature. In ad-
dition, it provides a report and certificate
of erasure, which comprises of notable infor-
mation such as the duration and status of
erasure, and the erase method used. Lastly,
Active KillDisk allows users to have control
of handling read/write errors by providing
options, including aborting entire disk era-
sure or aborting only failed items from group
processing.
Even though Active KillDisk supports
many erasing standards such as US DoD
5220.22-M and British HMG IS5 Baseline,
the free version is limited to only the One
Pass Zero.
4.4.1 Analysis
The results from running the “tasklist /v”
command also showed an unfavorable quality
in terms of its memory usage and showed
that it uses enormous amounts of memory as
compared to the other erasing tools. Below
are details of the run time, CPU Time and
Memory Usage of the erasing tool:
It was found that the md5 check-
sum of the wiped disk image was
948685d2633821f0533fdfc3fbcc86da, which
was different from that of the hardware-
wiped disk image. Using WinHex, it was
observed that all the sectors were zeroed,
with the exception of the first 512 bytes. The
disk image was imported into OSForensics’
Raw Disk Viewer To confirm that all of the
other sectors were 0’s and that disk erasure
started after the boot sector. The results
from OSForensics were similar to those of
WinHex showing O’s in every sector apart
from that of the boot sector.
4.5 Disk Wipe
Disk Wipe is a free and portable data sani-
tization tool licensed under a EULA license.
It is designed for personal use and supports
only the Windows Operating System. Disk
Wipe claims permanent erasure of data on
disk partitions and volumes and also erases
complete electromechanical hard disks and
Solid-State Drives. It has an attractive and
easy-to-use User Interface. Disk Wipe pro-
vides users the option to view contents of
specified drives and also allows users to skip
some wizard pages such as the ‘File System’
page and ‘Confirmation’ page.
The tool supports seven erasing stan-
dards namely: One Pass Zeros, One
Pass Random, Russian GOST P50739-95
(2 passes), British HMG IS5 (3
passes), DoD 5220.22-M(E) (3 passes),
DoD 5220.22-M(ECE) (7 passes) and
Gutmann’s Algorithm (35 passes).
During the erasure of the disk using the
One Pass Zero method, it was discovered
that Disk Wipe performs an extraneous and
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Figure 5. Run Time, CPU Time and Memory Usage of Active KillDisk
unneeded for wiping pattern (Secure Erase),
which lengthens the run time of the tool.
4.5.1 Analysis
It was observed that the run time of Disk
Wipe was almost twice that of most erasing
tools under review; this is due to the extra
Secure Erase performed during the disk wip-
ing process. Below are details of the run time,
CPU Time and Memory Usage of the erasing
tool:
4.6 Puran Wipe Disk
Puran Wipe Disk is a data sanitization tool
which is produced by the Puran Software
group. It has both free and commercial soft-
ware versions with the free version intended
for personal and non-commercial use. It sup-
ports only Windows OSs and is compatible
with Windows XP, Vista, Windows Server
2003, 2008, Windows 7, 8, and 10. Puran
Wipe Disk claims complete wiping of disks,
including the file system and all free disk
space. It also supports the wiping of multi-
ple disks simultaneously. The Puran Wipe
Disk tool has a very simple and presentable
user interface and supports three data erasing
standards, namely: Write Zero, DoD 5220.22-
M, and Schneier’s Algorithm. However, the
tool refers to the erasing standards differ-
ently as; 1 pass (faster and secure enough), 3
passes (slower and more secure), and 7 passes
(extremely secure and slow).
The downside to using Puran Wipe Disk is
the tool’s inability to wipe an active running
Windows drive. It also does not provide a
log report after completion of erasure.
4.6.1 Anlysis
It was observed that the run time of Pu-
ran Wipe Disk was similar to that of the
majority of the other tools being reviewed.
It also had a fairly low CPU Time as com-
pared to the other erasing tools. Below are
details of the run time, CPU Time and Mem-
ory Usage of the erasing tool: On analysis
of the disk image, it was discovered that
md5 checksum of the Puran Wipe Disk was
f73fc8a0f499c5f226d87543d24a351d, which
did not match with that of the Hardware
image. The wiped image was then imported
into WinHex to determine whether the boot
sector and the other sectors were completely
wiped. WinHex showed that the boot sec-
tor and the remaining space on the disk were
wiped clean with all bytes being 0’s. OSForen-
sics also showed all the disk sectors, including
the boot sector to be zeroed. The reason for
the discrepancy in the md5 checksums could
not be determined.
The observation from the analysis per-
formed on Puran Wipe Disk confirmed com-
plete disk erasure.
4.7 Remo Drive Wipe
Remo Drive Wipe is a Windows based eras-
ing tool that supports both 32-bit and 64-bit
versions of Windows 10, 8, 7, Vista, XP as
well as Windows 2003, 2008 and 2012. It
has both free and commercial licenses; both
intended to completely wipe disks and logical
drives. The tool supports 9 data sanitization
standards, but the free version is limited to
just three standards, namely: Fast Zero Over-
write, Random Overwrite, and the US DOD
5220.22-M . Remo Drive Wipe has a simple
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Figure 6. Run Time, CPU Time and Memory Usage of Disk Wipe
Figure 7. Run Time, CPU Time and Memory Usage of Puran Wipe Disk
and attractive design, and it provides an in-
formative user interface that makes it easy for
users to navigate the software. The tool also
provides users with a log report to provide
feedback after the completion of erasure.
4.7.1 Analysis
The observation made after the running of
Remo Drive Wipe showed that the run time
was longer as compared to most of the other
erasing tools under review. Below are the
run time, CPU Time and Memory Usage of
the erasing tool:
The md5 checksum of the disk im-
age from this tool matched with that
of the Hardware-wiped disk image -
1b26c0e62b79f528793199a3d2de4034. Anal-
ysis with WinHex confirmed that all sectors,
including the boot sector, wiped and over-
written with 0’s.
4.8 Super File Shredder
Super File Shredder, as the name implies, is
a file shredder that is used to destroy and
remove files from storage devices. It is a free
erasing tool that supports only the Windows
OS and is compatible with Windows 2000,
XP, 2003, Vista, Windows 7, 8, and 10. It
claims complete erasure of unwanted files,
folders and free space on drives.
Super File Shredder supports 4 erasing
standards, namely, Simple One Pass (Write
Zero), DoD 5220.22-M, Secure Erasing Algo-
rithm with 7 passes, and Gutmann’s Algo-
rithm (35 passes). Super File Shredder has a
simple and an easy-to-use user interface, as
shown above. The erasing tool also integrates
with Windows Explorer, which allows users
to right-click in order to gain access to the
software.
4.8.1 Analysis
After the running of Super File Shredder, it
was observed that the run time was similar to
that of most of the other tools under review.
Below are details of the run time and system
resource usage of the erasing tool:
The md5 checksum of the wiped disk im-
age, 4c0f90e5b4e87adc100fadd9fdf897f7, var-
ied from that of the Hardware-wiped disk
image, and as a result, an additional, more
comprehensive analysis was undertaken.
The wiped disk image was imported into
WinHex, and it was observed that the boot
sector contained data. OSForensics also con-
firmed this hypothesis, which meant that Su-
per File Shredder did not wipe the boot sec-
tor. Interestingly, OSForensics recovered a
number of files from the disk image. The
Searched Indexes, which included pre-defined
types such as emails and attachments, zip
and compressed archives, images, and text
files, produced 30 results. The results from
the search included System Volume Infor-
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Figure 8. Run Time, CPU Time and Memory Usage of Remo Drive Wipe
Figure 9. Run Time, CPU Time and Memory Usage of Super File Shredder
mation files, $Extend files, $RECYCLE.BIN
files, $LogFile , $MFT, $Volume, $Bitmap,
and other NTFS metadata files. The System
Volume Information folder comprised of In-
dexerVolumeGuid and WPSettings.dat files.
The $Extend folder included the $TxfLog.blf
file and other log files. Also, the $RECY-
CLE.BIN folder contained a desktop.ini file,
which is a Windows file that stores customiza-
tion details of folders (Computerhope.com,
2018).
In attempts to recover more system files
and possibly known user files, the disk im-
age was imported into Autopsy and scanned.
Autopsy recovered 2035 Orphan files from un-
allocated clusters, which had no data stored
in them but had valid modified, accessed, and
created dates.
Autopsy also confirmed the results from
OSForensics by showing the $Extend files,
$RECYCLE.BIN folder, and System Volume
Information files. In addition to the system
files, Autopsy recovered four known direc-
tories, but these directories had no files in
them apart from one that had one known
video file. The video file showed a known
filename and type but had a size of 0 bytes
and null metadata dates.
Lastly, Autopsy recovered an additional
30 PNG image files, two archive files, one
office document file, and one database file.
These recovered files, similar to the previously
recovered video file, had known filenames but
null metadata dates. Also, the md5 sums
of all the known recovered files were not the
same as those of the original files.
Based on the analysis of the disk image, it
can be concluded that some files, even though
having a size of 0 bytes, had valid filenames
and could be recovered after erasure using
Super File Shredder. Super File Shredder
also failed to erase a number of system files
from the disk.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The experiments conducted on each erasing
tool produced a range of results. Some tools
completely wiped the entire disk, including
the boot sector. Other tools also wiped the
disk but excluded the boot sector, and one
tool, while removing the content of a number
of files, still contained a number folder and
file names. Appendix B gives a summary of
the analyses of the erasing tools under review.
There are several conclusions that can be
drawn from the analysis performed on the
data erasing tools. First and foremost, the
successful and complete wiping of the disk by
some of the erasing tools such as Hard Wipe
and Puran Wipe Disk confirmed that the
write zero method is sufficient for disk era-
sure. Also, a single overwrite pass is enough
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to completely wipe a disk as Wright et al.
(2008) indicated in their paper, “Overwriting
Hard Drive Data: The Great Wiping Contro-
versy”. Although one pass overwrite is not
necessarily sufficient to make any potential
future recovery of the data infeasible, it is
adequate for the cleaning of personal disks.
It is advised that all erasing tools should have
verification after each pass they perform and
that this should be displayed to users to pro-
vide feedback on erasure.
Another conclusion derived from the anal-
ysis relates to the system resources of the
host machine. Based on the experiments
performed, it can be deduced that there is
no direct correlation between the system re-
sources (CPU time and Memory Usage) and
the effectiveness of the erasure tool.
It was observed that Active KillDisk had
the highest memory usage of 115 MB while
Remo Drive Wipe had the highest CPU time
of 6 minutes 24 seconds.
In addition, it was concluded that some
erasing tools do not address the boot sector
of the disk that is being erased and start the
overwrites after the first sector. This can be
seen in tools such as Macrorit Data Wiper
and Active KillDisk. In this context, data
found in the boot sector of a disk does not
infer that files, either user or system files, can
be recovered or carved from the disk being
erased.
After compiling the summary of the analy-
sis, it was also observed that five of the eras-
ing tools (i.e., Hard Wipe, Eraser, Macrorit
Data Wiper, Active KillDisk, and Puran
Wipe Disk) had similar run times ranging
from 28 minutes 37 seconds to 28 minutes 51
seconds. This may suggest that these tools
use either an identical or very similar base
code or algorithm in building their erasing
software.
Lastly, the results of the analysis confirmed
some of the conclusions drawn by Sansurooah
et al. (2013) and one by Martin and Jones
(2011). Sansurooah et al. (2013) concluded
that free erasing tools could securely and per-
manently erase storage devices. This theory
was confirmed in the outcome of the analysis
of tools such as Hard Wipe and Puran Wipe
Disk, where the disks were wiped clean, and
no data was recovered. In the case of Martin
and Jones (2011), it was discussed that file
erasers fail to erase some system generated
files. This hypothesis was confirmed when
Super File Shredder, a well-known file eraser,
failed to completely wipe system files such
as $Extend files and the $RECYCLE.BIN
folder. It was also deduced that the file eraser
removed files but ignored some directories,
thereby keeping the file structure.
5.1 Recommendations
Based on the results of the various experi-
ments, it can be recommended that for an
effective and secure erasing of an entire disk,
Hard Wipe, Remo Drive Wipe, and Puran
Wipe Disk should be considered. Complete
disk erasure means total wiping of the en-
tire disk, which includes the boot sector.
The three previously mentioned erasing tools
achieved this by wiping the entire disk com-
pletely.
Secondly, file erasers should be avoided if
the intention is to wipe an entire disk since
they have the tendency of ignoring the file
system, some directory names, and system
generated files. As a result, Super File Shred-
der was the least effective erasing tool that
was reviewed. The disk image wiped by Super
File Shredder still contained known directory
names and even some known file names. This
can be detrimental to owners who want to
permanently erase unwanted traces of activ-
ity from their storage device.
Lastly, it is advised that users avoid data
erasing tools that are obsolete and not being
supported and updated. The reason behind
this recommendation is that outdated tools
no longer receive technical support, hence
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during instances where there are software
errors and bugs, expert assistance cannot be
consulted, and as new versions of operating
systems are brought into use, there is no
guarantee that the tools will work effectively
on them.
5.2 Future Work
The area of the forensic analysis of data on
storage media is far from exhausted. From
the analyses and experiments performed in
this project, it is our hope that improvements
can be made to enhance testing in order
to make more concrete conclusions and rec-
ommendations. Future experiments will in-
volve a number of adjustments, such as using
other popular erasing standards, for example,
DoD 5220.22-M, pseudorandom data, and
Schneier’s Algorithm for disk wiping. This
is to test if the recommended tools from this
report perform equally well using other meth-
ods.
Secondly, future experiments in data eras-
ing will include a Solid-State Drive (SSD)
in place of an electromechanical hard drive.
The rationale behind this notion is because
of the different ways these two types of stor-
age drives store data. SSDs store data on
interconnected microchips and have wear lev-
elling software embedded while hard drives
store data on a rotating platter, which im-
plies there may be a need for different ways
of wiping these two types of drives. Similar
tests performed in this research will be con-
ducted to determine if SSDs can be easily
and completely erased, and the results ver-
ified. In addition, future tests will include
an assessment of the base codes of multiple
erasing tools. This is because of the suspicion
derived from the research in relation to the
very similar run times of the reviewed tools
and to determine if the erasing tools use a
similar production code.
Lastly, GUID Partition Table (GPT) will
be used as a partition style in place of Master
Boot Record(MBR). This is because GUID
drives use Unified Extensible Firmware In-
terface (UEFI) BIOS, which supports more
than four partitions on a disk and also sup-
ports disk partitions that are larger than 2
TB. GPT can support up to a maximum
disk capacity of 9.4 ZB. As a result of using
the GUID partition style, a larger number of
files can be used as datasets, and also larger
storage devices can be used in conducting ex-
periments. This will aid in checking if these
popular erasing tools have a maximum stor-
age capacity they can wipe.
6. GLOSSARY
• CPU Time: is the measure of how
much CPU cycles have been used since
the start of a process (Intel, 2019).
• Degaussing: involves the introduction
of strong magnetic fields to a magnetic
media in attempts to destroy the mag-
netic components of the device (National
Institute of Standards and Technology,
2006).
• GUID Partition Table: GUID stands
for Globally Unique Identifier, and it is a
new disk partition architecture that acts
as an improvement of the MBR parti-
tion scheme because of its partition size
capacity and other advantages (Diskge-
nius.com).
• MBR: stands for Master Boot Record
and is a type of boot sector stored in
storage devices that holds information
on how to start the boot process (Fisher,
2018).
• Media Sanitization: is the process
of ensuring confidentiality by effectively
erasing unwanted data from media
sources (National Institute of Standards
and Technology, 2006).
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• Orphan files: are deleted file items
that still have their metadata in the file
system.
• System Volume Information: is a
hidden system location on computer par-
titions that is used by the system’s repair
tools to save restore points and other
related data of the computer system
(Verma, 2017).
• $Bitmap: is a volume representation
which indicates the clusters that are al-
located (NTFS.com)
• $LogFile: is a log file used by
NTFS in recovery after a system crash
(NTFS.com).
• $MFT: is a file that contains informa-
tion of all files on the NTFS volume
(NTFS.com).
• $TxfLog.blf: TxF stands for Transac-
tional NTFS, and it is a temporary log
file used in backing up transactions to
prevent sudden crashes.
• $Volume: is a file that stores volume
details such as volume version, flags, and
labels (NTFS.com).
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Figure 10. Appendix A - Summary of Data Erasing Tools evaluated
Figure 11. Appendix B - Results from the analysis of the data erasing tools
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